Introduction
The term "Partnership" suggests a close relationship of two or more separate groups for the mutual benefit and the improvement of the overall environment in which they are operating.
The mutual benefit of each partner should not be at the detriment of the other partner or partners. Thus, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) refer to arrangements where the private sector supplies infrastructure assets and services that traditionally have been provided by the government (IMF, 2004) . According to Burger et al. (2008) , a PPP is an agreement between a government and one or more private partners (which may include the operators and the financiers) by which the private partners provide the service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners.
PPPs are complex contractual arrangements, and due to its long-term nature, they extend into an unpredictable future, which has been exacerbated by the current economic crisis in 2007/08. There has been a plethora of work done in the past on the subject of PPP to understand many complexities withstand these projects, i.e. Critical Success Factors (CSF) (Qiao et al, 2001 ), , (Zhang 2005 It is long sensed that a relationship between both public authorities and the private sector can be of mutual benefit and allow both parties to grow together. The public authority wants to ensure that a service or asset is of benefit to the regional economy or to the environment of the country, and the private sector is commercial in its approach and driven by ensuring 3 profitability to survive in a competitive market place. This suggests that there are conflicts of interests inherent within PPPs. Apart from the public and private sectors, other stakeholders also have different expectations from the PPP projects. For example, the users are the eventual beneficiaries of the project, and in the case of direct tolling, they are the unitary payer. There are also the financial contributors such as banks, investment funds and bond holders, who hope a high return on their investment over the course of their involvement in the PPP projects.
The term partnership relays the idea of a relationship that is symbiotic and is garnered with trust. This is perhaps an important element when considering the risk factors employed in such complex and capital absorbing projects. The understanding of the partnership between the public and private sectors is further divested into elements of stakeholders and respective political context, society, market economics, and private industry (Agyemang, 2011) . These stakeholder groups contribute to the successful implementation of PPPs, in that, their inputs are enabling the partnership to be created and the outputs being the benefits gained by each group. It is important to understand the individual needs of these groups and their subsequent relationships against the required outputs of a project when identifying projects that are being overall success. There is a synergy between partnering formation and relationships which requires exploration to ensure that success is a predicted outcome in all cases where PPP procurement is employed.
Another important term in PPPs is "funding", which may be misleading and often is confused with the term financing. In the area of infrastructure, funding is related to the origin of the payments to cover the costs of the public services, that is to say, who pays for it in the end; whereas, "financing" considers the source of the funds needed to build the infrastructure. Therefore, the party who lends or provides the money in the beginning usually requires a return as a compensation for the risk assumed and also expect the funds to eventually be repaid. The resulting amount of payments should cover the initial investment of the assets, the cost to maintain and replace them and usually an amount for expansion. There are 4 basically two funding mechanisms: public budget that eventually is supported by tax payers, and direct charges to users. The private sector will only participate if the project is financially feasible, which means that the expected payments will cover all costs including a return for the finance provided. Therefore, the first question to be answered by the public sector before promoting any public infrastructure is "how is it going to be funded?". Within this setting, the main idea of the paper is to identify the benefits and issues inherent in different approaches to payment of the services acquired through PPP procurement route. In order to fulfil the purpose of the paper, the on-going financing structures are analysed and their impact upon the risk factors of the projects are highlighted. Herein, PPP projects chosen are particularly chosen from road transport projects within the UK context.
PPP Road projects in the UK
In 1989 a public policy was adopted in the UK concerning measures for private sector integration in the provision of the road network expansion using the instrument of 'Tolls' as its basis. This led to the formulation of UK legislation such as the "New Roads and Street Works Act 1991" (Butcher, 2010) . The act laid out the provision of concessionary agreements between the government department and private group to design, construct and operate "special roads" (HM government, 1991). Infrastructure provision is a growth enabler, borne out by the ability to create infrastructure networks for commerce and citizens (Treasury UK, 2012 ). Within the current economic climate, it is perhaps important to note the capital investment needed is "intensive" for projects such as those in transport sectors (Gramlich, 1994 ).
The service delivery form of PPP has been adopted in the UK through the use of private sector where additional management of the infrastructure is needed. The term Public Private Partnership is not a specific form of procurement and the literature reviewed embodies the pantheon of different models which fall under the umbrella of PPP. The variety of In 1992, the UK government launched the PFI programme, under PPP, to facilitate the public and private sector co-operation, as a way of benefiting the public sector from the private sector expertise and managerial project capacity. In order to procure some roads, the Highways Agency was formally started in August 1994. The main approach adopted herein was Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO), with the exception of previously designed Built-Operate and Transfer (BOT) model for M-6 Toll Road. The objectives of this DBFO contract basically aimed to promote innovation in financial and commercial arrangements, transferring the appropriate level of risk to the private sector, minimising the financial contribution required from the public sector. By 2012, the UK, overall, has had 717 PPP road projects, of which 648 are already in operation. This was an increase from 712 (and 631 in operation) in 2011. In value terms, this amounts to capital costs of £54.7 billion (HM Treasury, 2012).
The Highways Agency used some of the aforementioned schemes to provide new and improved roads to ensure the maximum benefit to road users at the minimum financial contribution requirement (Highways Agency, 2012). To cater for this, the Agency promotes the involvement of the private sector road-operating industry, transferring many of the risks to the private sector and promoting innovation in many areas such as technical, operational, commercial and financial. Thus, UK was a pioneer in introducing innovations in new models of PPPs, but also adapting the PPP framework to new needs and market trends. The UK authorities have also been active in producing new regulation and standardisation in PPPs (HM Treasury, 2007) , ( HM Treasury, 2012) .
Despite expansion of PPP road sector, in July 2012, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Chief Secretary to the Treasury announced that the UK guarantees scheme, which aims to kick start critical infrastructure projects, may have been blocked because of adverse credit 6 conditions. Around £40 billion of projects could qualify for the provision of guarantees in infrastructure sectors such as transport, subject to meeting some criteria. In 2012, the UK government also carried out a review of the performance of PFIs in general, and has concluded that VfM is not, in reality, being achieved in many PPP road projects. From this review, a number of measures were put into place including a voluntary code to improve transparency and improvement of the strategic relationships (HM Treasry , 2012). The most fundamental change instigated from this review is the implementation of a new scheme called 'PF2', by looking at the lessons learnt from the original PFI structure (HM TreasuryInfrastructure, 2012). There are main reforms introduced with the new model with regard to new finance measures, risk allocation (greater risk retention by the public sector), procurement (new standard documentation and timetable), transparency (government annual report and higher control as well as equity return publication) and services (excluding soft services such as cleaning and catering). In terms of finance measures, the government is planning to take a minority interest share in future projects, introduce a funding competition for a portion of private sector equity mainly looking to long term investor such as pension plans), implement new measures that aims to limit the ability of investors to generate excessive profits on sale of their equities and facilitate alternative debt providers.
A new model called Non-Profit Distribution model (NPD) conceived as an alternative to the PPP/PFI was also developed in Scotland, and is being used to fund projects in three main sectors -further education, health and transport. Benefits perceived by the NPD model, in the view of the Scottish government, are: 'capping' to ensure a "normal" level of return to the private sector; improved transparency; SPV operational surpluses reinvested in the public sector; stakeholder involvement included in the model facilitating a more pro-active and stable partnership. The NPD model is already being used with a package of road schemes in Scotland worth approximately £1 billion. The first of these is the M8 road (Scottish Policy Now, 2012). At the end of March 2015, the total value of NPD projects under construction has reached £1.8bn. The image of a coming together of public bodies and private providers to procure a service or infrastructure asset in PPPs is ambiguous when set against the methods used by different investment criteria. The use of investment from the private sector is significant in times of wider austerity and the adoption of partnering for such large projects can benefit the needs of both the public and private sectors. However, a number of issues can occur when proposing the use of PPP procurement methods as opposed to more traditional and accepted methods.
Road investment and payments -The UK PPP Context
The UK is a significant market for the delivery of large capital investment projects through the use of PPPs. Due to current macro-economic issues in the UK; the government adopted a policy which utilises the PPP model in the creation of large scale infrastructure projects. This is an aid to driving economic growth and connecting industry efficiently, in order to wider global economic markets, particularly directed to the expansion of the road networks. Within a reduced spending policy of the government, the involvement of the private sector and alternative financial institutions is now regarded as the only real alternative. The benefits of creating PPPs (Spackman, 2002) has been acknowledged as lower costs in projects than if carried out wholly by the private sector; and a higher rate of quality than if the project was wholly operated by the public sector (Mozoro & Gasiorowski, 2008; Rangel & Galende, 2010) . Historically, the investment vehicles employed in a significant number of road infrastructure projects have been wholly financed without recourse to public funds. The Public partner pays for the service provided by the private sector partner, thus, creating a market which the private sector may find attractive for long term investment. The return of the investment on such projects in terms of revenue streams and payment structures have altered due to political and social pressures during the last 20 years. often a risk of optimistic bias in demand estimates on the part of the public sponsor. As a result, the cost to finance the project may become prohibitive. Notwithstanding these risks, one of the main benefits of using direct tolling is the avoidance of burden upon the public budgets, therefore, ensuring no impact in government deficit, a result that is very appealing within the political system.
Alternative payment models employed bypass these concerns of the public, as the payment is made by the government rather than by the user, such as shadow tolling, and performance related techniques. However, shadow tolling reverses the effect of optimistic bias on the government and, therefore, there is a risk that payments may increase beyond anticipated levels, unless payments are capped to a maximum level. The private sector is more content to operate within contracts that use shadow tolling because of lower traffic volatility and, therefore, higher revenue predictability. Hybrid shadow tolling methods attempt to overcome this risk, incorporating performance criteria into the contract. This, in effect, incentivises the private sector to ensure the road is available and safe to use. There are penalties where there are failures in these key performance measures. Performance related payments benefit both the public and private sectors, by incorporating it into the payment structure. This method of payment structure is a preferred option for many in the private sector and those involved in the financing of these projects. The risk profiles of projects using performance measures as payment are lower than those for projects just as direct or shadow tolling translating into competitive stable interest costs. This though can also lead to a potential benefit to the private sector provider in the event of refinancing.
Refinancing often takes place after project completion, when there is a different risk profile, has extensively studied the CD contracting dynamics, forms, framework and processes applied in the Dutch highways, particularly from the Coen Tunnel project.
The financial crisis produced a credit crunch which strongly affected to privately financed infrastructure projects and road projects in particular, shortening the overall financing availability and increasing the cost of financing. This had a special impact on the funding arrangements worldwide considering the dependency of PPP funding from capital markets highlights the need to be more strategic in the approach to financing and delivering road infrastructure in the UK over a long period of time with improved relationships with providers (Cook, 2011) . The answer to the above was introduction of strategies by the government to look at "radical" alternatives to the financing of roads in the future (Transport, 2012) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 For a project to be of interest to the private sector, project 'profitability' needs to be assessed. Shadow tolling and performance payments are predominant amongst these methods of assessing profitability. Within this context, one of the first matters to be considered is the payer of the road services. In a pure toll road, the user pays directly to the concessionaire; whilst in other PFI projects, the Highways Agency is the one who is responsible for payments for the service provided to the user. However, such payments can differ according different payment mechanisms used; and based on usage, demand, availability of services and performance of the contractor/operator can be evaluated. There are three payment mechanisms commonly used within the PFI projects; 1) Shadow toll plus safety payment minus lane closure charges; 2) Availability plus safety performance; and 3) Active management, congestion payments plus safety performance. These different forms and mechanisms are presented in Table 1 .
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It is worth noting how some of the basis of the payments are based on, are adapted and are combined in every contract according to the objectives of the road project, and the areas which special operating management is focussed. In this regard, one of the most innovative features is the congestion management base. This considers actual speed in comparison with the target speed to make payments. This promotes the PFI operator's ability to manage the traffic congestion. However, the mechanism does make allowances depending on Page 11 of 35 International Journal of Managing Projects in Business   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 whether or not the operator has control over recurrent congestion when the volume of traffic demand approaches the full capacity of the road. The following presents the case analysis adopted for the study based on these different payment mechanisms.
Insert Table 1 : PFI UK payment mechanisms
Case Analysis -Methodology
This Primary data for this study are basically obtained from these filled case templates (which were then transferred to a case database). Semi-structured interviews were conducted and 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 13 secondary data was also collected to fill in the templates. A manual Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) approach was employed to provide contextual and evaluative understanding of the data collected. This enables a diagnostic study of the outcomes to be carried out (Ritchie & Spencer, 2002) .
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Four road case studies that are currently in operation in the UK were selected to achieve the main purpose of this paper (see the introduction section). The four projects selected are; M80 Haggs Motorway, A19 Dishforth, M6 Toll road and the M-25 Orbital. These projects represent differing government sponsors, methods of repayment structures, geographical demands, tendering processes, innovative approaches, user acceptance, etc; thus, it was one of the main criteria used when selecting the projects. The following sections detail the case study information.
Project Descriptions, Funding Methods and Financing

A19 Dishforth
A19 Dishforth is a brownfield project and it is one of the several PFI road projects developed during the mid-1990s as part of the government Tranche 1A PFIs (Partnership UK, 2009 ).
This tranche was more sophisticated than its predecessors, with a scope for the private partner to improve the road through innovation and better service delivery. The initial construction costs were only £29.4 million, although the contract value is worth more than £300 million. The term of the concession is 30 years. The small size of the project means that, financing could be obtained by the contractor fairly easily. The original bank lenders were CIBC Bank from Canada and IBJ Bank from Japan. This was important as the banks held the bonds and guarantees during the construction phase. However it is noted that, for this project, the construction phase was smaller compared to other projects.
The current incumbent of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. with no shareholders and loans facilitating the venture. This is different to the original scheme
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International Journal of Managing Projects in Business   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 14 where there was a consortium including a number of shareholders. Currently the only "external form of investment" is bank loans. It is worth noting the role that the 30-year contract has on the financial structures; the public sector acknowledge that the contract period was beyond the limits of conventional finance instruments, and this meant the adoption of innovation to the factors of success in the formation of the project (Highways Agency 2012).
The proposal of refinancing appears to be a function that the public sector believes will be carried out by the private sector partners (Highways Agency, 2012). The project agreement is on a Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) procurement model. The contract is fully privately financed and it mainly covers operation and maintenance.
M6 Toll
The M-6 toll road is mostly a Greenfield project, and it is the only direct toll road in the UK.
The initial construction costs of the project were £485 million, but the value of the contract is estimated at £900 million. The term of the concession is 53 years, to allow investment recovery. Its private partner is named Midland Expressway Ltd. The principle equity holder within the SPV is Macquarie Infrastructure Group.
Originally known as the Birmingham Northern Relief Road (BNRR), the project was initially developed as a traditional public sector road scheme, but local objections ended in a public inquiry in 1988. Later, BNRR was chosen as a 'test case' for private financing and tenders were called in 1990; and a detailed proposal was prepared by the successful bidder.
The original Concession was held by a consortium of Kvaerner and Autostrade, but it was later passed to Macquarie group. This refinancing option proved a contentious issue to the public sector as it enabled a profit to the equity provider. The project presents 30% of the asset value for the equity holder portfolio (M6 Toll, 2008). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 During the contract formation of the project, it was specifically mentioned that this project will be financed without recourse to the government. This was due to the then government (in 1991, the Prime Minister was Margaret Thatcher) lacking the ability to directly fund large infrastructure projects and the desire to encourage the private sector to invest in the infrastructure of the UK. The financial close of the project was reached in Feb 1992. This scheme originally was conceived as a traditionally public procured road but eventually the model proposed was that of a Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) DBFO that was only exceptionally used within UK PFI. The Financiers for this project were Banque Indosuez 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 interest cost up to 33% over the lifetime of the project and some critics claim that no mechanism monitors the windfalls that providers can make from selling on their stakes. In late 2010, HSBC purchased 42% share of the project through its special vehicle HICL (The Construction Index, 2010). In 2012, Bilfinger Berger carried out a remodelling of their portfolio, and this preferred investment remained within the group, since this payment method offers predictability low risk volatility for investments (Bilfinger Berger Global Infrastructure SICAV S.A., 2012).
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M-25 Orbital
The M-25 Orbital road is a brownfield project that has been conceived in different forms. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 27. This is to be completed by February 2015. Connect Plus is a consortium of Balfour
Beatty (40%), Skanska (40%), WS Atkins (10%) and Egis Projects (10%).
The project consists of maintenance and operation of the road and many technical innovations were also required to be incorporated onto the road project. These innovations have also improved time reliability, road safety and driver's information.
Following the credit crunch that started to emerge by the end of 2007, there were uncertainties about the funding capacity to raise the necessary funds by the bidders. For this reason, the Highways Agency decided that it was essential for the bidders to submit a funding plan, and deliver evidence to show that the funding plans are realistic and deliverable.
After the evaluation of these later retenders, the Connect Plus consortium was appointed as the preferred bidder in June 2008, although it was only in February 2009, when the contract was officially awarded.
However, the funding was an issue and the Department for Transport (DfT) came forward to provide up to £500m of senior debt itself as a co-founder, in line with the new role of TIFU, (Treasury's Infrastructure Financing Unit). Finally, the funding structure of the project consisted of commercial bank debt provided by a 16-bank club deal for £700 million, EIB credits for £400 million and shareholder equity for £200 million. Part of the EIB participation was backed by an additional commercial bank facility for £215 million provided as EIB guarantees, whilst the rest £185 million consisted of EIB structured finance facility.
Therefore, in total, it raised a £1.1 billion senior debt loan facilities, that represented about 85% of the total funding (85/15). The legal tenor was 27 years, although it includes some incentives to shorten the term, as margins became more expensive as time goes by.
Financial markets were not easy after the economic downturn in 2007/08. There were many provisions and compensation introduced by banks in last moment, such as margin ratchet and cash sweep. In effect, banks were reluctant to lend long term debt and these two 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 elements were introduced to heavily encourage an earlier refinancing. In addition, a rebate mechanism was introduced by the Highways Agency (Project Finance International 2013).
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According to NAO (2010) , the interest rate margin for the M-6, considered a medium level of project risk was 2.5-3.5% and the total interest cost 6.9-7.9% for different stages.
Given all the details discussed above, the following table (Table 2 ) summarises the main features of the four case studies in three dimensions: i.e. public, private and users.
Insert Table 2 : Case study Descriptions
Case Studies Analysis and Discussion
A detailed analysis of the selected case studies is presented in Table 3 . The summary includes applied methods of payments, funding sources, risk profiles and financing details.
Insert Table 3 : Case study comparisons In A19 project, the method of payment adopted was shadow tolls. The adoption of shadow tolling as a payment structure is based on vehicle KM travel with penalty measures against availability and safety performance. The issue of changes to the financial position of the SPV and its shareholders was not explicitly incorporated into the contract at the beginning; therefore, the flexibility of the form of contract meant that, although change was not envisioned, there were review processes to allow protection of government's interests.
Within the contract there was no provision to share the potential "windfall" brought with refinancing, which in the case of M6 Toll led to a parliament enquiry.
In a typical PFI payment scheme, shadow toll revenues steadily increase as project gets mature and, in the final phase of the project, revenues sharply decrease, as the debt is As for the M6 toll, the payment method employed is direct tolls. The government originally considered reviewing the toll every twelve months; however, according to the concession agreement, tolls are to be reviewed on a six-month cycle. The toll charges were established to ensure that the project is self-financed and the only recipient of the toll revenues is the SPV. The impacts of the economic downturn had a significant reduction in usage of the road, The M6 toll road was introduced to relieve over capacity in the M6 motorway (Birmingham/London road). However, M6 motorway has traffic levels that are similar to the levels prior to opening of the Toll operated section. This means that the cost/benefit rationale offered by this scheme does not seem to create value for money for users. The typical revenue flow profile in the pre-analysis phase usually consider a "ramp up" period when high increases in revenues are produced to be followed by a consolidation phase in which a small but steady average growth, similar of that of the population growth, is achieved. However, under this model, the volatility of the revenues is high, especially because it's reliant on the user fees. Thus the income is directly correlated to the economic trend. Notwithstanding that revenue volatility, availability payments made by the government induce some income stability, anticipating some of the benefits of a blended payment model. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 21 M80 project was the first road project to adopt Competitive Dialogue method in Scotland for tendering. This was carried out in 2008. The use of a DBFO was the outcome during the competitive dialogue process. At the end of the dialogue, Transport Scotland's view was that the dialogue ensured a meaningful relationship could be built considering the long-term nature of the project. However, from private sector viewpoint, they felt that potential innovations were not taken up due to the dialogue being restricted to talk only about the needs of the public sector. This could be due to the lack of familiarity of the form of tender employed. Thus, instead of outlining the required outputs in the form of deliverables with attached KPIs, the public sector have focussed more on detailing the specifications of the project.
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The competitive dialogue process was also the driver for changing the payment mechanism from shadow toll to performance related pricing structure in the project. The performance relate payment suggested was based on availability, carriage way performance and safety impacts. However, there were lack of incentives for improvements over and above the agreed performance levels. This means that, although the project is successful overall, it has not fully reaped the full benefits of performance related payment mechanisms.
M25
Orbital has a payment scheme based on availability and performance safety. There are several components of this payment mechanism: lane availability, network condition, safety performance, route performance, active management and incident management. As part of the project, considering that there is an existing road with consolidated traffic, it was very important to have the roads available at all times to avoid congestions, and to find a quick and effective action in case of road works and/or unfavourable weather conditions. In addition, it was it was also needed to improve the safety level, offering the best quality of the road and, therefore, reducing the number of accidents. Due to all above, payment mechanism based on availability and performance safety was identified as the most appropriate.
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Pain/gain measures may also apply with regard to safety performance, incident management focussed on restoring capacity after critical incidents, and with regard to route performancea similar measure to congestion management that may be positive for reliable journeys, or negative for delays. Finally, a bonus for helping to achieve aims and objectives may also be obtained as a proactive management strategy. Overall, the discussions given in this section is summarised in previous table 4.
Implications
The selected four case studies have used different payment mechanisms, i.e. performancerelated payments (M-80), shadow toll (A19), availability payments (M-25) and direct toll (M-6). Thus, they present a diversity of issues regarding financing gain (mainly in M-6), operation, demand, risks, and/or innovation in term of traffic and road management (M-25), etc. A summary of the identified implications of the case study findings are presented in Table 4 . It clearly shows differences in project performance as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the project. It also points out the main features of the projects that may illustrate evolution of UK PPP/PFI.
Insert Table 4 : Case study implications
Within the main benefits of the DBFO contracts included in the different PFI tranches, as A19 Dishforth, it may be highlighted the development of a private sector road operating industry, 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 improving the partnerships between public and private sector and transferring appropriate levels of risks to the private sector. But is also notable how this initiative has provided many improvements in public policy related to cost certainty, more reliable and accurate expenditure forecast and also has open scope for innovation in many areas, including financing, but specially in the method of service delivery aiming at cost saving in the road operation. This project also shows a high degree of output specifications which defines how the service has to be delivered. In the end, the main objective of this policy has been to provide better value for money. It is clear from the case studies that 'demand' is a key criterion implemented into the business case for road transport schemes, particularly those adopt PPP as the preferred procurement route. In all cases, demand was measured over a considerable period of time. Demand is a measurable quantum, which is also utilised as a mode to encourage investment and private sector participation.
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The issue where risk is transferred without allowing the private sector to innovate in mitigation does raise the potential that costs are transmitted back to the public sector for this service. The most significant current risk in effect for the M6 Toll is that of demand risk. From the data analysis it can be seen that demand is strongly weakened by the macro-economic effects, although this has accelerated the down-ward trend for use of this carriage way, there was a weakening demand prior to 2007. Public acceptance has a direct bearing, due significantly to the cost of use and this implies that for direct tolling to be an effective method of payment, the government needs to work in conjunction with the private sector in promoting direct tolling.
Demand in use can be seen a risk for the public sector providers as demonstrated in the M80 project. Where the potential use is underestimated in appraising the procurement and payment methodology, the outcome as identified by the data, is a significant increase in revenue for the private sector partner and the risk of reduced value for money to the public purse. Had the use of competitive dialogue been employed, then a structure of cost reductions could be used as the road reaches its capacity limit, in effect, offering a share of
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International Journal of Managing Projects in Business   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 the revenue back to the public sector for a profitable and sustainable income to the private sector partner. This sharing of the income benefit was not explored as the tendering procedure, although a dialogue was led by the public sector sponsor. Herein, flexible and blended payment structures which offer benefits to both parties in the partnerships will encourage trust. This approach will also have positive effects on the financial sector and user groups of stakeholders.
It is suggested that Financing and refinancing of these projects may incur additional burden to the risk profiles of the projects. However, this will differ in how they affect the public and private organisations involved. It is also suggested that the contracts used for the case study projects offer no ability for the public sector to seek benefit from refinancing of the projects'
debt. This is in contrast to the monetary benefits acquired by the owners of the SPVs, suggesting that value for money to the public will diminish without tools to seek mutual convenience. This was clearly the case in the M80 project. In a situation like this, the response by the Public sector sponsor may be to launch a review and instigate a new procurement model, e.g. NPD model introduced by the Scottish government (please refer to section 2).
The M25 orbital case study is a good example for financial development and innovation.
This project shows how a large and strategically significant deal may attract finance to road projects, even in adverse financial market conditions derived from the economic downturn.
Nevertheless, there were doubts about the capacity to fund such big projects, and one of the suggestions was the switch to short-term lending that became a trend since then. Moreover, even though banks could still commit some kind of long-term facilities, the capital markets have reacted imposing tough conditions in prices -thus, in practice, it meant that shifting to shorter term solutions was much better. High profit margins by the private sector absorbed value for money of the project and eroded the attraction to PFIs in comparison to other procurement methods. The main lesson learnt from this case is, even in hard times there is appetite in the financial markets for PFIs using project financing; however, successful 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 25 development of the project requires favourable financial conditions to launch this type of large projects (Project Finance International 2013). From the above, with regard to the financial markets and their influence on the lifecycle of road projects in the UK, it seems evident from the analysis of the four case studies, especially from the most recent project of the four cases (i.e. M25), that the market trend is to offer short term capital provision. This approach of utilising short term capital from the financial markets and the use of consortia for the construction phase passes to a single operating equity provider in some of the cases reviewed. This means that, only private sector providers with the capacity to provide substantial equity long term enter into the market. An alternative could be incentives for the investment and capital markets to take a long-term interest in PFI projects and offer support to the private sector. A potential change in the funding structure from short-term capital support to longer-term equity by the financial markets is a suggestive improvement, which can bring many benefits. However, this may depend on the market conditions. This approach will open the UK road PPP market to alternative providers which will bring with them experience and alternative solutions. In this regard, the government needs to adopt greater expertise and confidence when operating with the private sector. Confidence is critical to increase value for money to the public sector and the experience obtained from projects needs to inform newer proposals. The government is also an influencing factor over the user and communities. For this reason, transparency is paramount to ensure acceptance of not only the need for expansion of the road network, but also the method of procurement and payment structures employed.
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Payment methods are possibly the utmost method for expressing whether a project is successful. It is evident, though that a balance is necessary to ensure that viability of the project for both public and private partners. A structure that operates to give surety of income to the private sector whilst ensuring the public sector is not overly burdened with paying for the risk provisions could provide a balanced cost/benefit system.
26
Conclusions
The term Public Private Partnership is not a specific form of procurement and the literature reviewed embodies the pantheon of different models which fall under the umbrella of PPP.
The variety of arrangements used in PPP models can be complex and may suit specific projects better than another. These arrangements become even more complex when set against the methods used by different payment criteria. For example, the adopted shadow toll model in A-19 has attracted private sector participation, however, it holds a significant burden, in the future, to the public budget. By trying to make a higher risk transfer to private sector, M-6 toll project releases liabilities from the public at the expense of the users who suffer a high toll price with an applied no cap regulation. Refinancing this project at operations start, brought substantial benefit to the private holder but there is no evidence to sharing gain with public users. The Scottish government, following PFI policy, have introduced the competitive dialogue as a trial to best adopt performance methods of payment instead of fully transferring demand risk to the private sector -this is the case in M-80. M-25
is an example as to how innovations and mixed payment methods can be adopted, as it was developed under adverse market conditions and low willingness to accept demand risk profiles.
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